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Abstract: 
Purpose: This paper aims to frame organisational cybersecurity through a strategic lens, as a function 
of an interplay of pragmatism, inference, holism, and adaptation. We address the hostile epistemic 
climate for intellectual capital management presented by the dynamics of cybersecurity as a 
phenomenon. The drivers of this hostility are identified and their implications for research and practice 
are discussed.  
Design/Approach: The philosophical foundations of cybersecurity in its relation with strategy, 
knowledge and intellectual capital are explored through a review of the literature as a mechanism to 
contribute to the emerging theoretical underpinnings of the cybersecurity domain.  
Findings: This Conceptual Paper argues that a knowledge-based perspective can serve as the necessary 
platform for a phenomenon-based view of organisational cybersecurity, given its multi-disciplinary 
nature.  
Research Implications: By recognising the knowledge-related vectors, mechanisms, and tendencies at 
play, a novel perspective on the topic can be developed: cybersecurity as a ‘knowledge problem’. In 
order to facilitate such a perspective, the paper proposes an emergent epistemology, rooted in systems 
thinking and pragmatism. 
Practical Implications: In practice, the knowledge-problem narrative can underpin the development of 
new organisational support constructs and systems. These can address the distinctiveness of the 
strategic challenges that cybersecurity poses for the growing operational reliance on intellectual 
capital. 
Originality/value: The research narrative presents a novel knowledge-based analysis of organisational 
cybersecurity, with significant implications for both interdisciplinary research in the field, and practice. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity theory, knowledge-problem, intellectual capital, strategy, complexity, 
epistemology, systems theory 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Information Technology and the Cybersecurity Problem  
Since its popularisation, information and communication technology has redefined economic value 
creation by enabling businesses to decrease their dependence on tangible assets and capital, in favour 
of intellectual capital. This, in turn, has made most markets rely on what Kuehl (2009) describes as the 
first man-made domain. A benefit of exploiting the cyber domain is the newfound ability of businesses 
to leverage its relative absence of temporal and geographical constraints as an enabler of novel 
business models. However, an increasingly meaningful side effect of this reliance lies in the scope of the 
vulnerability it entails. Cyber threats can disrupt the security, stability and sustainability of 
organisations by affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of informational/structural 
capital. Examples of this potential for disruption and the externalities it imposes range from 
organisational collapse (i.e. Ashley Madison - Baraniuk, 2015), to the incapacitation of the 
infrastructures of nation-states (Kaiser, 2015; Zetter, 2016). Even when discussing the societal effects of 
cybersecurity, organisations still present themselves as the core vectors of action, given their dual role 
of technology developers and facilitators of its use. Paradoxically, cybersecurity remains a secondary 
task within most business models, as it provides limited opportunities for monetisation and value 
creation — the organisational raison d'être. Given its adversarial dynamics, cybersecurity strategy is 
rooted in a metaphorical self-perpetual 'war' scenario, which, unlike its individual 'battles', cannot be 
definitively won. In other words, cybersecurity is not a problem that can be 'solved'. Furthermore, much 
like most strategic endeavours, cybersecurity management exhibits an epistemic core.  
 
1.2. Cybersecurity, Knowledge and Intellectual Capital 
‘Knowledge’ as a construct permeates the cybersecurity and the wider organisational risk narratives in a 
number of ways. The link between risk and knowledge has been highlighted by Neef (2005), who 
argues that an organisation's ability to effectively manage risk is rooted in its ability to manage relevant 
knowledge. In relation to cybersecurity, Tisdale (2015) outlines the need for multi-dimensional 
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approaches which expand the 'typical' technical outlook, in favour of a systems/complexity orientation 
and a knowledge management foundation. Within an Information Security context, Shedden et al. 
(2011:152) illustrate the importance of accounting for the risks towards "the cultivation and deployment 
of organisational knowledge". Julisch (2013) describes a relationship between knowledge limitations 
and the ineffectiveness of a cybersecurity strategy as evidenced by an over-reliance on intuition, absent 
security foundations, inadequate governance, or a dependence on static/generic 'knowledge' of the 
context. In a broader context, Kianto et al. (2014) argue that organisational value generation based on 
intellectual capital is inherently moderated by knowledge management practices. Given that 
organisational cybersecurity management aims to protect both intellectual assets and their 
operationalisation, it fulfils a moderating function for the value generation process, converging with the 
domain of knowledge management. 
Besides their relatively consistent, complementary message, these papers exhibit significant 
epistemological variability as they reflect the dominant themes of their individual disciplinary settings. 
This hinders the clarity of this shared narrative, though not necessarily of the individual papers. The 
absence of a common interpretation of knowledge limits the homogeneity of insight and prescriptive 
utility that can be achieved through a phenomenon-driven, rather than a discipline driven approach. 
The former enables studying organisational cybersecurity as an interplay of technology, people, and 
processes, with a focus on competitive performance, intellectual capital and sustaining value creation. 
Although Intellectual Capital is a well-established and flourishing research topic, it is still perceived as 
one that continuously evolves (Guthrie et al., 2012) in response to changes in the social, economic and 
technological environment.  Defined as “the sum of everything everybody in a company knows that gives 
it a competitive edge. Intellectual capital is intellectual material, knowledge, experience, intellectual 
property, information that can be put to use to create value” (Dumay, 2016, p. 169), most scholars 
acknowledge the role of intellectual capital in value creation. That means a shift in intellectual capital 
research from the organisation to its wider ecosystem, where knowledge and value are created 
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(Dumay, 2013; Dumay and Garanina, 2013, p. 21). Paradoxically, cybersecurity risks emerge as a result 
of –among other factors, the systemic interaction of those elements that form the organisational 
ecosystems and which they, in turn, contribute to shaping, such as the organisation’s internal processes 
and its modes of competition and value capture. Subsequently, a solely technical outlook on 
cybersecurity as a function is myopic, failing to account for emergent socio-technical organisational 
mechanisms and processes involving the organisation’s human, relational and structural capital, which 
underpin value generation. This leads us to argue that a knowledge-based view of cybersecurity and its 
management would have a direct effect on intellectual capital management by affecting the dynamics 
of human, relational, structural, as well as renewal and trust capital (Kianto et al., 2014). 
We also argue that a core pillar for meta-disciplinary inquiry into a strategic perspective of 
cybersecurity is the notion of knowledge. Knowledge, in this context, must be anchored within the 
characteristics of its application setting in order to avoid ambiguity, tautological definitions and 
conceptual inconsistencies. More specifically, this paper aims to help both the cybersecurity research 
and practice communities engage with the distinct strategic challenges that organisations face in the 
pursuit of a localised, and at the same time evolving approach to cybersecurity. These challenges, 
which are described at length in the following sections, highlight the essential role of knowledge — not 
just as an asset, but also as the dynamic output of continuous processes, for both the effectiveness and 
the efficiency of defensive strides.  
Furthermore, we argue that an explicit, context specific epistemological foundation is essential for the 
reconciliation of the variety of perspectives and dimensions of cybersecurity management and 
strategy. Such an epistemology should enable cybersecurity strategists to guide their efforts based on 
contextually appropriate answers to fundamental questions such as: "What can be known about cyber 
security vulnerabilities and threats?", "What is cyber security knowledge?", "Where to look for it?", and, 
"How can it be used?". In addition, we aim to provide a relational understanding of core epistemic 
constructs such as knowledge, uncertainty, beliefs, and truth in the context of organisational 
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cybersecurity.  
To achieve its aims, the remainder of this paper has been organised as follows: a critical overview of 
knowledge in its role within organisational literature is provided in section 2; section 2 also explores the 
epistemic substrata of cybersecurity strategy and is used to propose an explicit epistemological 
position. Finally, section 3 explores the regularities of cybersecurity epistemic challenges which must be 
accounted for in the development of a phenomenon-oriented approach to organisational defence.  
 
2. Knowledge, Strategy and Cybersecurity — A Theoretical Precursor 
Throughout the last three decades, interpretations of knowledge as a construct have underpinned 
several core strands of strategic management and organisational theory. Examples include the 
Knowledge Based View of the organisation (Curado and Bontis, 2006), Dynamic Capabilities 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zahra and George, 2002; Arend and Bromiley, 2009), and Knowledge 
Management (Nonaka and Peltokorpi, 2006; Ragab and Arisha, 2013). However, the utility of such 
attempts has been put into question for reasons which include an unclear or contended interpretation 
of knowledge (Wilson, 2002), varied degrees of perceived empirical utility (Edvardsson, 2009; Ibrahim 
and Reid, 2010), overly divided themes which dilute the original vision of progress (Davenport, 2015) 
and, eventually an inability to circumvent Occam's razor (Wilson, 2002).  
This tradition of employing ‘knowledge’ as an explanatory or a prescriptive construct presents 
regularities which are noteworthy when applied to an epistemic view of organisational cybersecurity 
strategy. Identifying what distinguishes an 'effective’, or at least enduring epistemic foundation of 
concepts in organisational theory remains a speculative endeavour. However, the significant body of 
literature on the topic provides a blueprint of key aspects that position individual conceptualisations in 
a wider context. These are generally interdependent, and include the epistemological stance which 
informs the locus of knowledge (i.e. the knower), its manifestation/form (the known), as well as the 
role, the nature and the attainability of truth. We also hold the relational positioning of uncertainty as 
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contextually relevant.  
All of these points will be addressed through an evolutionary lens of organisations as function-selected 
hierarchical systems. This perspective serves as a heuristic for representing the role of market 
competitive mechanisms and dynamics as adaptive pressures and change triggers. Furthermore, as we 
explore strategic knowledge as an enabler of inference and effective decision making, we recognise the 
influence of assumptions about cognition and environmental dynamics in these processes. This allows 
us to anchor the discussion beyond its philosophical roots to accommodate the progress made in 
studies of cognition, and systems theory for organisational cybersecurity in the following chapter. By 
doing so, we aim to support the establishment of a phenomenon-oriented approach to strategic 
enquiry on the topic, based on an adequate epistemic diagnosis of the predicament that organisations 
face. This, we hold, enables the conceptual framing of organisational cybersecurity in a discipline 
agnostic manner, which presents novel avenues for investigation, and a range of potential investigative 
tools.  
In order for this to be achieved, organisational cybersecurity knowledge will be explicitly explored in 
line with the previously outlined ‘blueprint’. We will therefore start by considering the applicability of 
individual and collective views of knowledge in the current setting of analysis. 
 
2.1 Locus of Knowledge: Systemic View 
Given its turbulent role as a construct in organisational theory, the notion of knowledge is difficult to 
address in the absence of context-specificity. As a central topic in the evolution of philosophy, a 
continuum of positions can be identified, that are distinguishable in their views on both the object and 
the subject of knowledge. The relationship between the 'knower' and the 'known' is thus a key area of 
contention of the philosophical divide. Proponents of an individualist position view knowledge and the 
knower to be indivisible for most purposes. Subsequently, they hold that attempts to 'manage' the 
epistemic contents of an organisation are generally concerned with information mistaken as knowledge 
  7 
(Wilson, 2002). In an attempt to distinguish the concept from information, Nonaka and Peltokorpi 
(2006) argue that " ... knowledge is about beliefs, commitment, perspectives, intention and action". 
This perspective supplements the Platonic notion of the belief as the unit of knowledge (Boisot, 2011), 
which is generally accepted beyond disciplinary confines, by associating it with intention and action.  
However, we view this perspective as limited within our context, as it induces a systemic myopia due to 
a sole focus on individual beliefs and actions. Such a mechanistic representation can underemphasise 
the role of coordinated knowledge networks which exhibit non-summative attributes. They also enable 
collective, complementary patterns of action and behaviour reflecting emergent social and epistemic 
dynamics. Within the context of organisations, these are also moderated through structural power 
dynamics. As a result, we do not deny the role of the agent as the basic locus of knowledge, but instead 
propose that this position is limited when explaining phenomena which span across levels/systemic 
hierarchies, i.e. the behaviour of an organisational function. Thus, the locus of knowledge must account 
for the role of the cognisant agent within his/her social context of action (Brown and Duguid, 2001; 
Guzman and Wilson 2005) and on externalised, 'objective knowledge' which underpins explicit critical 
inquiry (Popper, 1978).  
An increasingly widespread perspective in evolutionary psychology and cognitive studies explores 
knowledge and rationality through the lens of their teleologic function. This view suggests that, given 
the hyper-social evolutionary niche inhabited/constructed by humans (Laland et al., 2000; Sperber and 
Mercier, 2012), the primary functional evolutionary pressures imposed on reasoning and, thus, 
conceptual knowledge processes, have been of a social nature. Implicitly, the general problem-solving 
attributes of reasoning are exaptive (Gould and Vrba, 1982), i.e. a side-effect of a different teleological 
function. 
This perspective supports the view that knowledge has an essential social form, beyond its individual 
relativist (Proctor, 1998; Wilson, 2002) and abstract "objective" dimensions (Popper, 1978). Such an 
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interpretation favours a pragmatic, systems-oriented view of knowledge in organisations. If knowledge 
is a lever for shaping intent into action, the activity of an organisation is conditioned by a coordinated 
network (with potentially multiple sub-systems) of knowers. As individual action in such settings relies 
on the structure and the requirements of the system, its pragmatic utility is reflected in the 
performance of overall system.  
Furthermore, new knowledge can be made ‘useful’ (i.e. actionable towards achievement of an objective 
of the organisation as a system) through an interplay of dissemination and coordination strategies 
where the influence of individual knowers can be leveraged into action through structural mechanisms 
including not only the human capital of the organisation but also its relational and structural capital. 
Similarly, evolving environmental pressures can render previously effective representational models 
and knowledge objects locally maladaptive – a core premise of ‘organisational unlearning/relearning’ 
processes (Zhao et al., 2013). Thus, a collective perspective also influences what constitutes the unit of 
knowledge, bridging the gap between actor belief and systemic action. The ‘claim’ in this case seems to 
be more compatible with both the formal evaluation process needed to pursue the justification 
component of the Platonic ‘justified true belief’, and with the notion and degree of truth (Popper, 
2005).  
The utility of the claim as a unit of knowledge relies on a recognition of the fact that the relationship 
between claims and beliefs is not absolute. While claim validation/evaluation procedures may not be 
sufficient to change individuals’ beliefs and behaviour, identifying discrepancies between the two is 
possible by recognising indicators of anomalous action. This ability to identify relevant patterns of 
inconsistencies between claims and beliefs as drivers of action is analogous to a meta-cognitive process 
— seeking knowledge about knowledge and its limitations. Tracking and adapting inferential 
representations and procedures requires an externalised unit of knowledge, especially in a collective 
setting. Thus, a relational dynamic base of knowledge claims enables a collective meta-cognition 
analogue, and the pursuit of adaptive epistemic measures. Such an ability is undoubtedly valuable 
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within the context of strategy formulation as a precursor to rational adaptation and heuristic selection. 
(Peters et al., 2010). 
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2.2 Epistemic Pragmatism 
“Truths in strategy are neither certain nor final, and our wishing cannot make them so. 
Whatever philosophical foundations strategy may build upon — pragmatist or otherwise — they 
must surely incorporate this difficult truth.” (Powell, 2002, p.879) 
The emerging narrative places our interpretation of knowledge at the intersection of pragmatism and 
critical realism. We present this stance as ‘bottom-up’ pragmatism due to the central 
evolutionary/competitive focus, the epistemological centrality of action and utility, as well as the locus 
and unit of knowledge. Unlike other epistemic processes, such as scientific enquiry, organisational 
knowledge is adaptive to the extent that it is useful in better enabling/sustaining value creation. This is 
particularly relevant for cybersecurity as a function which cannot be monetised within most business 
models, yet preserves Intellectual Capital and its operationalisation process. The resulting position 
shapes notions such as certainty, belief and truth. It also holds knowledge as emergent from the 
interaction between the subject and the object of inquiry. In doing so, the conceptual emphasis on an 
abstract, traditional interpretation of truth is avoided in favour of a more dynamic, evolutionary focus 
(Proctor, 1998).   
In practical terms, our approach to the study of cybersecurity knowledge entails a focus on three key 
aspects: (1) fitness-inducing belief-claim systems, (2) adaptivity — that is, an adaptive approach to the 
formation of beliefs to facilitate coevolution between the system (i.e. the organisation or community of 
practice) and its environment, and (3) an understanding of knowledge as context-bound. Clarke (1989) 
presents a 'theory of rational acceptance' as a pragmatic alternative to the emphasis on truth. 
Acceptance is presented as the balance between the costs associated with adopting a mistaken 
proposition and the costs of gathering additional evidence to inform a decision. As knowledge 
development in organisations is in itself pragmatic (purpose bound) and contextual (utility constrained), 
and addresses a diverse mix of dynamic ontological phenomena which are deemed relevant to 
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organisational activity and performance, the truth value of individual beliefs is local, temporary, and 
secondary to their ability to trigger favourable action.  
From a strategic perspective, the core utility of knowledge is inferential (Mercier and Sperber, 2011). By 
its very nature, strategy formulation addresses future occurrences. However, its role in decision-making 
entails the use of perception and observations (representational or procedural) for the identification 
and exploitation of ontological regularities which connect behaviour patterns with specific outcomes. 
So, for example, vulnerability management entails identifying conjunctures between the attributes of 
systems and possible patterns of behaviour (malicious or otherwise) which can lead to inferable, 
undesirable consequences. Within this context, knowledge about other conjunctures which do not fit 
this pattern lacks direct strategic utility, as it does not enable inferences related to the area of concern, 
while the absence of ontological regularity, generally through complexity, limits possible inferences to 
a meta-representational position — knowledge about (lack of) possible knowledge, and its limitations. 
(Allen, 2007) 
2.3 Knowledge and Uncertainty 
The limitations of knowledge, both current and potential, are generally addressed through the notion 
of uncertainty. Haimes (2011, p.1178) defines uncertainty, from a systems-based outlook, as "the 
inability to determine the true state of a system". Such inability can be rooted in the presence of 
"incomplete knowledge" (i.e. "epistemic uncertainty") and/or in "stochastic variability" (i.e. "aleatory 
uncertainty"). Unlike epistemic uncertainty, stochastic variability does not, by definition, address 
representational regularities which could be illuminated through additional knowledge.  
Within the context of risk and decision-making, Cox (2012) classifies uncertainty based on its attributes 
rather than its cause. Subsequently, if a system cannot be accurately modelled, or if its future states 
cannot be reasonably foreseen, it can be argued that the system exhibits "deep uncertainty".  Allen and 
Boulton (2011) on the other hand equate deep uncertainty to complexity (i.e. non-linear dynamics). On 
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this basis they propose that, given the limitations of inference/planning under deep uncertainty and the 
inherent inability to suppress the stochastic variability through enquiry, assumptions ground the 
projection of a system's state and enable a representation of conditional/probabilistic 'certainty'. Thus, 
the use of assumptions as epistemic crutches in areas of deep uncertainty, such as cybersecurity 
strategy, is unavoidable.  
Outside of the systems-based perspective, Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014) argue that such 
assumptions, in the form of heuristics, are central to human cognition given its perceptual and 
inferential limitations and high environmental complexity. In a more rigid approach to the subject, 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014) describe uncertainty as characterising any situation outside of 
complete, or probabilistic certainty. That is, a situation where causal relationships or outcomes are not 
knowable, or where risk cannot be inferred probabilistically. Risk assessment in this case relies either on 
the characteristics of the situation/system (i.e. a-priori), or on statistical analysis in conditions of highly 
homogenous occurrences.  
Based on the interpretation above, 'technologies of rationality' (March, 2006) such as risk management, 
adaptive management or resilience management have a heuristic function within the context of 
organisational cybersecurity management. Such approaches generate an output of contingent 
certainty through a series of processes underpinned by meta-representational assumptions concerning 
what is known and what can be known. In doing so, the core uncertainty faced by decision-makers in 
the context of cybersecurity is only addressed by traditional business strategy tools to a limited extent. 
This leads us to argue that the accuracy of the output of a management strategy is determined by how 
applicable the specific process it uses is to its application setting, rather than by the 'goodness'/'quality' 
of the heuristic in itself — a context-construct fit. Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) describe this fit 
through the concept of 'ecological rationality' and position it as an essential consideration for decision-
making under uncertainty.  
  13 
From a pragmatic perspective, achieving a satisfactory degree of ecological rationality and, implicitly, 
inferential accuracy, does not necessarily entail a suppression of uncertainty concerning the properties 
of the system. Instead, it entails an ability to accurately evaluate the local fitness of a heuristic in 
relation to a set of expectations. This can take the form of feedback-based adaptation, which can 
include experiential learning, learning from others, and variation/selection processes (March, 2006). 
Through such approaches, a contextually sensitive, meta-systemic type of knowledge can be generated 
concerning conjunctures of system states, environment states, and applicable strategies. At the same 
time, given the established belief-claim dependence of knowledge, and the structure-persuasion 
requirements for individual knowledge to trigger action in organisations, the occurrence of learning 
driven by ecological rationality is not generalisable for it to cover contexts such as cybersecurity.  
As a result, we argue that, in relation to cybersecurity strategy, knowledge should not be treated as an 
asset, but as the contextually sensitive foundation of inference manifested in beliefs and claims (which 
underpin representational models and procedures), and, thus, as the dynamic determinant of the 
context-construct fit in cybersecurity decision-making. At an organisational level, the individual nature 
of the belief is often circumvented by using attributes related to local structure and 
information/knowledge dissemination. As a result, organisations can exercise rational order (McKelvey, 
2001) in spite of the potentially heterogenous individual beliefs of members. Furthermore, the efficacy 
of actions which target the dynamic characteristics of a problem is likely to be increased by an 
awareness of the inferential potential of the various approaches to decision making and heuristics 
inherent to a given environment. Based on our proposed interpretation of knowledge, the essential 
mechanism of calibration of the organisation strategy relies on assimilation of feedback and strategies 
for selection of adaptive pathways. An ability to distinguish adaptive beliefs becomes the precursor of 
knowledge building. The following section explores why organisational cybersecurity strategy is 
conditioned by a fundamental knowledge problem with local manifestations, and societal 
consequences. 
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3. The Cybersecurity Strategy Knowledge Problem 
Throughout the previous section we have proposed that the strategic utility of knowledge is inferential, 
as it guides system behaviour towards desired future states which, by definition, cannot be directly 
observed. Management strategies must infer the value of the procedures/processes employed in 
relation to an objective based on available evidence. The effectiveness of local measures of uncertainty 
mitigation must be evaluated. This applies even to adaptive strategies which rely on a suppression of 
inference due to a distrust in the accuracy or the utility of the process. As a result, the notion of a 
'knowledge problem' in relation to cybersecurity strategy can be perceived as a descriptor of a hostile 
context for effective inference. This can entail the absence of observable ontological regularities, or 
limitations in the ability to acquire and use relevant information concerning the vulnerability base, 
relevant threat behaviour and the potential effects of cybersecurity incidents on business or society.  
 
3.1 Ontological Nonlinearity of the Cybersecurity problem 
In line with systems-thinking, the degree of complexity which characterises a problem area determines 
the utility gained through predictive/inferential approaches by constraining what can be known (Boisot, 
2011). Complexity, in this sense, entails nonlinearity within a system's interacting elements. Complex 
systems should also be distinguished from complicated systems which, in spite of high dynamism and 
convoluted behaviour, exhibit linearity and causal consistency (Phister, 2010; Merali and Allen 2011). 
Thus, the term complexity is used to describe a vast spectrum of system behaviour. Benbya and 
McKelvey (2006a, p.17) suggest that systems can exhibit three possible states: stable, chaotic and an 
intermediate state of "critical complexity", "emergent complexity" or "melting zone". Stable system 
behaviour entails causal linearity and proportionality. Any uncertainty in such systems is epistemic and 
can be mitigated against through the assimilation of sufficient and adequate information. On the 
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opposite pole, systems in chaotic states offer no inferable regularities, and are characterised by 
predominantly stochastic uncertainty. As the consistent lack of regularity can be considered a 
regularity in itself, knowledge collected about such systems is meta-representational, that is, 
knowledge about knowledge.  
Information Security (IS) has been explored through a chaos-theory perspective by Sharma and Dhillon 
(2009). We hold IS chaotic behaviour as a scale-dependent phenomenon, given aggregate incident 
consistency which indicates patterns of emergence. For example, while longitudinal studies such as 
Romanosky's (2016) generally show patterns of regularity in their representations of cybercrime 
incidents at a macro-level, it is unlikely that the volume and type of incidents faced by the individual 
actors included shows any degree of consistency. This phenomenon is compatible with what Manson 
(2001) classifies as aggregate complexity — a distinct branch of complexity studies which focuses on 
interactions between linked system components. Such interactions can show emergent regularities 
that cannot be decomposed or inferred through a mechanistic perspective (Gershenson, 2013). These 
regularities may result from a range of possible interactions between the different components of a 
complex system and with those in its environment (Rickles et al., 2007). In practical terms, within the 
context of cybersecurity breaches, a specific effect such as loss of Intellectual Property can be 
generated by malicious actors in a number of ways (i.e. threat vectors), depending on the properties of 
the system within a specific setting of space and time. 
In addition to the dynamics of relationships, emergence and locality as defined by the interaction 
between system components and the environment, Manson (2001, p.410) also outlines the key role of 
'learning and memory within systems’, embodied in their structural adaptation which is often enabled 
by the variety of its components.  As the state of a system is to a large extent the result of its exposure 
to evolutionary pressures, the attributes that define such a state are likely to be have been used to 
make past decisions on the fitness of the system. When faced with novel conditions and relationships, 
such systems therefore rely on those same internal structures and sub-systems for their adaptivity. 
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Thus, if no adequate adaptive change pathways are available, a system lacks resilience to 
perturbations, which may lead to a structural collapse (Holling, 2001). In this sense, social systems such 
as organisations are distinct. Their ability to make inferences is anchored in structural and cognitive 
mechanisms that expand the scope of their base of representations and procedures beyond those 
inherent to the system and its structure. For example, an organisation can adapt to the destructive 
potential of a cybersecurity breach in an anticipatory manner as long as the occurrence and 
consequences of such breach have been adequately inferred in advanced.  
All of these indicators of non-linearity are likely to influence an organisation's ability for effective 
inference in relation to its cybersecurity efforts. For example, vulnerabilities emerge from the structure 
and patterns if interaction of a system’s actors and its technological infrastructure, rather than from an 
additive logic between the two. The assessment of a system’s vulnerability entail the inference of 
potential threats which could exploit a system component/attribute. It also relies on the 
conceptualisation of a relevant, homogenous, hierarchical and temporal sample of reference, and the 
consideration for adaptive pathways which are grounded in the properties and 'capital'/potential which 
have been historically accumulated by the system (Holling, 2001). Finally, an awareness of potential 
disproportionality in the causal relationships between threads and vulnerabilities is also required. While 
this may seem a convoluted way of describing a vulnerability within the context of cybersecurity, it 
illustrates the embedded complexity of the concept which can be masked through implicit 
assumptions. This view also highlights the need for an emphasis on holism as a way to interpret discrete 
phenomena within the context of systemic strategy, as argued by Haimes (2012).   
However, the emphasis on holism can raise analytical difficulties in systems which cannot be outlined in 
objective, consistent ways. The presence of an organisation in the cyberspace or ‘digital world’ is 
generally shaped by the interaction between software vendors and developers, system architects and 
engineers, technologically active employees, managerial initiatives, organisational partners and end-
users. Thus, delimiting the 'cyber perimeter' of an organisation can be difficult, as vulnerabilities can 
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emerge from sources that are, by their very nature, outside of the organisation. This network of 
interdependencies and the subsequent sensitivity to non-local phenomena (i.e. externalities) highlight 
the coevolutionary nature of organisational systems whereby "all 'evolution' is really coevolution..." 
(Benbya and McKelvey, 2006b, p.287). Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, given the secondary role of 
cybersecurity in organisational value creation, cybersecurity performance relies on the local 
manifestation of threats, on the organisation's adaptive capacity, namely 'system learning' and 
positioning, as well as on its ability to develop, sustain and adapt adequate inferential procedures, and 
to act on resulting insights.   
From a different perspective, the high degree of abstraction that complexity theory entails in relation 
to a micro-setting (e.g. that of an organisation) limits its practicality. The process of employing its 
principles for prescriptive use in the form of concrete actions and strategy is subject to interpretation. 
However, this ontological framing carries significant, more direct implications for the notion of 
knowledge, as it anchors the concept of knowledge in the principles of feedback and adaptation. In 
addition, a complex systems view provides a series of general, abstract assumptions which relate to the 
regularities that underpin any rational interpretation of cybersecurity. These include a limited accuracy 
in the quantification of dynamic, non-linear phenomena; the scale-dependent emergence of system 
attributes and patterns; a local manifestation of non-linearity and stochastic uncertainty; and finally, an 
emphasis on adaptive mechanisms and co-evolution. Additionally, within the context of the 'knowledge 
problem' narrative, the systems perspective introduces a meta-cognitive dimension to the core logic of 
inference, strategy and action. In the absence of a cognitive anchoring, beliefs are replaced by path-
dependent, context-defined tendencies as drivers of behaviour. Historically accumulated structures, 
sub-systems and relations define the foundation for adaptation when faced with perturbations. Even 
when accounting for cognition, this ontological substratum confines available system pathways and the 
ability to respond, and relies on the 'belief' -arguably knowledge, as a trigger of action.  
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3.2 Epistemic limitations 
The second dimension of the knowledge problem narrative lies in the exploration of the epistemic 
barriers faced, which are primarily information-oriented. This section addresses those phenomena that 
must be accounted for when formulating a cybersecurity strategy, which impede the ability to exploit 
regularities through inferential procedures.  
3.2.1 Adversarial Adaptation and Asymmetry  
One possible starting point in the exploration of epistemic uncertainty in relation to cybersecurity 
strategy is the informational asymmetry between the attacker and the defender. Although the 
adversarial macro-dynamics of this relationship are core to all competitive strategy, the contextual role 
of information is distinct, as breaches generally rely on an informational imbalance. Attackers aim to 
acquire advantageous information concerning potential vulnerabilities and target appeal, while defence 
generally entails an anticipation of possible, or at least likely threats. This asymmetry is amplified by 
the ability of malicious actors to empirically validate assumptions and dedicate their full focus to finding 
a contextually adequate attack vector. In contrast, organisations as targets are primarily concerned 
with (market) value creation and maximisation, and therefore must centre their defence on the 
proportionality of their effort in relation to the perceived/assumed scale of the threats. Also, from the 
perspective of threat actors the costs of unsuccessful attacks are generally low, whereas unsuccessful 
defence can significantly affect operational sustainability of the attacked entity. There is an additional 
asymmetry in the objectives of each side: a successful defender must protect against all significant 
breach attempts, while a successful attacker must only achieve a single breach. A noteworthy trend 
relating to this asymmetry is the increasing complexity of cybercriminal operating models, which 
increasingly leverage specialisation and risk-spreading to form what Kraemer-Mbula et al. (2013) refer 
to as 'cybercrime ecosystems', and Thomas et al. (2015) call 'the underground economy'.  
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3.2.2 Information sharing limitations and information asymmetries: sector-specific variation and 
reliance on third parties  
Information sharing is widely seen as a beneficial mechanism for the mitigation of the attacker-
defender asymmetry previously described (Gal-Or and Ghoose, 2005). As a principle, it is central in a 
wide range of national cybersecurity strategy and policy initiatives (e.g. UK Cyber Security Strategy - 
UK Government 2009, 2011; the Cybersecurity Strategy for the European Union - European 
Commission 2013; EO 13691 - White House 2015). However, in spite of these efforts from policy-
makers, effective information-sharing is, subject to sector-specific exceptions, impeded at least partly 
by the tension between the potential utility and the sensitivity of the shared content. This phenomenon 
is not novel. Ziv (1993) highlighted that without an ability to enforce 'truth telling', participants in 
information sharing within oligopolistic circumstances are incentivised to prioritise the 
(mis)representation of their position and strength. The resulting market dynamics positions third party 
vendors as key owners of aggregate information. However, this also increases a misalignment in 
incentives to share information, as the 'state of affairs' can be misrepresented in favour of a 
strategically convenient narrative (Greenberg 2012). Furthermore, given the contextual dependencies 
which shape the nature of cyber incidents beyond the technological layer, and difficulties associated 
with the establishment of complex causal narratives (e.g. Detection proficiency, Osbourne, 2015; 
Attack attribution, Rid and Buchanan, 2014), the knowledge value of external incidents can vary 
significantly.  
 
3.2.3 Misaligned incentives: Strategic Ignorance, Biases and Assumed Rationality  
Incentive misalignments occur at multiple levels within the context of cybersecurity, and can damage 
trust and result in deviations from expected behaviour and outcomes. As a result of misaligned 
incentives, gaps can occur between the representations that feed strategy development and the actual 
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behaviour of agents. More specifically, Moore (2010) proposes a link between information systems 
failures and the misattribution of liability away from the actors that are responsible for defence. 
Misaligned incentives are likely to occur in dichotomous aspects of cybersecurity, such as the trade-off 
between accessibility/efficiency and security. Behavioural studies indicate that individuals are likely to 
favour approaches that are optimised for their operational priorities, often in the detriment of security 
(Kraemer et al., 2009; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012). As a result, the effectiveness of security policy relies 
on the identification and the discouragement of process deviations which fall outside of the scope of 
the chosen security stance. Without an awareness of actual beliefs and practices driving such 
deviations, subsequent strategy formulation is likely to employ a distorted interpretation of problem. 
This brings to light a well explored limitation of risk models and technologies of rationality in general, 
namely the behavioural variability from rule-based representations of rational behaviour and reasoning 
(March, 2006; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012). Inference into the behaviour of systems and agents must 
rely on a representation of likely actions and outcomes. However, the discrepancy between expected 
rationality models and actual behavioural tendencies has, over time, produced a significant stream of 
literature and distinct disciplines such as behavioural economics, with the aim of understanding and 
exploiting regularities in 'irrationality' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; 
Slovic et al. 2005). While the association of widespread cognitive tendencies and inferential 
mechanisms with the notion of 'irrationality' based on norms derived from traditional logic has been 
questioned (Gigerenzer, 1996), their role in problematic decision-making settings, such as 
cybersecurity, is uncontroversial (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012). As a result, a knowledge centred 
approach to cybersecurity strategy must incorporate means of calibrating local assumptions about the 
projected and the actual behaviour of relevant actors. Game-theoretic approaches have been proposed 
for this purpose as essential tools in understanding threat behaviour (Bier et al., 2008). However, their 
heuristic nature raises the issue of ecological rationality as a precondition for their utility.  
3.2.4 Limited Capabilities and Situational Awareness  
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Finally, a key barrier to the development of knowledge in the context of cybersecurity strategy 
formulation lies in the confines of the local capabilities and situational awareness exhibited by 
individual organisations. Discussing this factor at a high level of abstraction is difficult, as 
generalisations can only provide limited insight in relation to specific settings. However, capabilities 
and cyber situational awareness, as defined by Franke and Brynielsson (2014), are an overarching 
theme which underpins an organisation’s strategic positioning, cyber resilience and responsiveness to 
environmental dynamics. Both the cognitive and the technical dimensions of an organisations’ cyber 
situational awareness are underpinned by specific skillsets. Proxy indicators for the aggregate 
availability of such skillsets, such as the dynamics of the employment market for roles related to 
Information Security or Cybersecurity, indicate a justifiable, rapid growth in the corporate interest 
within the field. However, in spite of centralised efforts being made to proportionally increase the 
supply of expertise, there are a number of barriers which affect progress in this area. These include the 
absence of a centralised, common body of knowledge of the cybersecurity domain; the evolving, 
context-dependent requirements of the role; and the emphasis on "experience and social factors” over 
“learned technical skills and graduate entry" (Reece and Stahl, 2015, p.193).  
4. Conclusions 
Cybersecurity management is a challenging dimension of the modern organisational landscape, and 
requires consideration within strategies, values, structures, and practices. Its importance is exacerbated 
within organisational models which leverage intangible assets and intellectual capital as the primary 
platform for value generation. We argue that cybersecurity strategy is a multifaceted construct which 
benefits from a knowledge-centric narrative. From this new perspective, a cybersecurity strategy built 
upon effective knowledge management practices has the potential to channel the organisation’s 
intellectual assets and their operationalisation towards value creation. This paper has set out the basis 
for such a narrative and highlighted the need for a pragmatic view of knowledge which entails emphasis 
on 'belief-(claim)-action-result' rather than 'information-truth-belief-action' when preparing for, dealing 
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with, and recovering from cybersecurity incidents. By anchoring it to action, we have presented 
strategic knowledge as a local construct bound in its scale, scope and time value.  
We have also addressed the concept of uncertainty in the context of cybersecurity and its 
management. We suggest that uncertainty is a nested concept which is subject to a meta-
representational form of knowledge, that is, knowledge about lack of cybersecurity knowledge within 
the boundaries of the organisation. We argue that although assumptions are essential in navigating 
uncertainty, they require a continuous calibration to reflect the interaction between non-linear 
environmental dynamics and the organisational momentum. Erroneous assumptions can be both 
highly costly and not evident to the management board, especially when supporting a 
plausible/expected narrative. That is why an adaptive epistemic approach to cybersecurity 
management is essential.  
We also propose that, like cyber vulnerabilities, organisational knowledge is emergent. Cybersecurity-
relevant organisational knowledge cannot be described as a sum of knowledge and beliefs of all 
internal organisational actors, and instead is a function of the structure-mediated interactions between 
actors, their beliefs and the environment, which serve as a source of adaptation/calibration for further 
behaviour.  
Finally, we argue that a cybersecurity management strategy requires an ability in rigorous formulation 
and for its continuous adjustment so that it yields a contextually satisfactory result.  The central 
argument put forward in this paper is that to achieve such a result, organisations require an ability to 
overcome the spectrum of ontological opaqueness and epistemic limitations derived from non-
linearity, cognition/agency, social structures and organisational behaviour and technological attributes. 
The relative manifestation of these limitations is likely to be local, organisation-specific, and closely 
related to the organisation’s intellectual capital base, despite their seemingly general nature. However, 
as cyberspace is an increasingly embedded part of core societal structures, there is a noticeable 
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evolutionary imperative for (organisational cybersecurity) phenomenon-driven approaches to better 
understand and engage the disruptive behaviour and potential of threats. We argue that a shared 
interpretation of knowledge is central to the multidisciplinary cohesion needed to support 
organisational cybersecurity efforts.  
Our contribution goes beyond highlighting the potentially tautological claim that knowledge, and 
therefore intellectual capital, is important for strategy, to propose a context-specific conceptual 
interpretation which includes the aspects that substantiate the distinct 'knowledge problem' imposed 
by cybersecurity. This presents numerous opportunities for further empirical and conceptual studies, 
exploring the practical implications of the knowledge-problem lens. Given the emphasis on context-
locality, the perspective put forward would benefit from both explorative and comparative case-
studies. In addition, the three core components of the knowledge-problem argument should be 
critically examined in practice. Finally, the prescriptive implications and potential should be explored 
from the perspective of the dominant constructs/approaches, including cyber risk and resilience 
management. 
While approached as an organisational issue, cybersecurity presents significant externalities for 
individuals and society at large. In order to support organisations in their efforts, a realistic and 
comprehensive picture of the adaptive constraints they face is needed. Underpinning expectations of 
reasonable organisational security investments and efficacy lies a localised ability of making adequate 
inferences within the strategic context. The local scope of ‘unknown unknowns’ and erroneous 
representational models underpinning inference serves as a barrier for pursuing contextually adequate 
defensive measures, to the detriment of both the organisations and their stakeholders. Thus, beyond 
incentives and penalties, there is a societal imperative of supporting and fostering the organisational 
means of tackling the knowledge problem.  
4.1. Future work 
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By focusing on the multi-disciplinary nature of cybersecurity, this research has highlighted the 
importance of a knowledge-based approach to the study of the concept, which represents a novel 
perspective on the subject. The view of organisational cybersecurity as a ‘knowledge problem’ opens 
new areas for the study of the concept beyond its technological dimension. Interdisciplinary research is 
encouraged based on a systemic, pragmatic interpretation of knowledge as a meaningful dimension of 
effective cybersecurity management in organisations. In particular, we propose that further research 
take this perspective as a starting point to study the link between cybersecurity and value creation, 
mediated by knowledge and intellectual capital. Examples of such research could include: in-depth case 
studies exploring the conceptualisation and epistemic substrate of organisational cybersecurity 
management practice; the development of practice-oriented/operational frameworks aimed to assist 
organisations; and critical analyses of the implications of a knowledge-based interpretation of 
cybersecurity management. Such contributions would serve to consolidate the theoretical, 
empirical and methodological foundations of cybersecurity as an enabler of business strategy, 
addressing the distinctiveness of the challenges that it poses for the growing operational reliance of 
organisations on intellectual capital. 
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